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Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship
in Canada. Leonard Ian Rotman. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1996. xX+484 pp. Notes, references, and index. $60.00 cloth (ISBN 0-80200821-6), $24.95 paper (ISBN 0-8020-7813-3).
In 1984, Canada's Supreme Court stunned Ottawa by ordering the
Department of Indian Affairs to compensate an Indian Reserve for the
Department's mismanaging of a golf course development. Federal management of Indian lands under the Indian Act had previously been regarded as
discretionary and unreviewable, but the Supreme Court threatened to hold
Canada to a high standard of "fiduciary responsibility" in the exercise of its
sweeping powers over Indian nations.
The implications of this landmark decision remain uncertain, however.
Canadian courts are hesitant and inconsistent when they invoke the fiduciary
principle, and Ottawa strenuously denies any application of fiduciary standards to the quality or quantity of Federal programs in areas such as education and health.
What has been missing, Leonard Rotman contends in Parallel Paths, is
a coherent theory based on the origins and functions of the Crown's fiduciary responsibility to Indians. His attempt to fill this gap is flawed, regrettably, by historical fictions and internal contradictions, and does more to
legitimize the Federal supervision of Indians than to validate its restriction.
Rotman characterizes Europeans' intrusion into the New World as a
unilateral exercise of power, albeit frequently justified on the pretence of
advancing civilization. He nevertheless contends that British promises to
protect Indian nations from encroaching settlers were sincere, and without
historical support substitutes the Supreme Court's concept of "fiduciary
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responsibility" for the promises actually made. The Crown must keep its
promises, Rotman concludes, because Indians believed them in the past and
continue to rely on them today.
Rotman's search for the origins of the fiduciary principle takes legal
concepts out of historical context. The "protection" to which early British
diplomats referred had a specific meaning in the Law of Nations: an exclusive defensive military alliance. The idea that civilized nations had a "sacred
trust" to civilize savages was only formally adopted as a principle of international law at the 1885 Berlin Africa Conference. The Berlin Act may have
encouraged Ottawa to disregard Indian treaties in pursuit of the higher goal
of world civilization, but it had nothing to do with Georgian diplomacy on
the Niagara frontier.
The Supreme Court itself inferred the Crown's fiduciary duty from the
Crown's unilateral assertion of broad supervisory powers over Indians,
which largely occurred after 1867. Rotman's efforts to lend historical support to the Court's decision not only conflict with the Court's own analysis,
but lays a trap for Indians, since his argument implies that Indians accepted
British power in exchange for a "fiduciary relationship." This contradicts his
insistence that European empires imposed themselves on indigenous peoples
for selfish reasons. Was the relationship built on trust and mutual benefit, or
was it colonial in purpose and structure?
Sanitizing history in order to sell the fiduciary principle to the Canadian public is a cynical exercise in political optics. Calling Ottawa a "fiduciary" will not, moreover, make privilege, domination, abuses of power, or
incompetent bureaucrats go away.
Although Rotman's apparent aim is to devise new legal tools for First
Nations to defend themselves against abuses of Ottawa's power, he becomes
an apologist for the persistence of that power. If Canadian Indians are
seeking greater autonomy, they need to be liberated from legal theories
legitimizing Federal supervision by making it seem less threatening and
more manageable.
Parallel Paths does not ponder the absurdity of trusting the state to
ensure the selflessness of its own actions. Here is the fatal defect in the legal
imagination: thinking that laws somehow exist outside of the state that
makes and applies them and can therefore be used to tame the state. Lawyers
can be relied on to perpetuate state power, as de Tocqueville astutely observed in Democracy in America.
Parallel Paths recalls the debate among American Indians in the 1970s
over the idea of Federal "trust responsibility," which the U.S. Supreme Court
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had enunciated in 1973 in a case involving the mismanagement of Indian
forests. Many Indian leaders refused to endorse the idea of Federal trusteeship because they could not accept the legitimacy of Federal supervision. It
is distressing to see Canadians once again following the footsteps of Americans into the quicksand of misguided policy. Russel Lawrence Barsh,
Department of Native American Studies, University of Lethbridge.

